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UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE: MOVING TOWARD A MORE
BALANCED FOOD REGULATORY REGIME
A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson
For decades, the federal government has played a significant role in
promoting healthy eating. In the early 1900s, the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) promoted a foundational diet of milk, proteins,
fruits and vegetables, and grains.' Most Americans are at least somewhat
familiar, although perhaps confused, with the more nuanced healthy eating
recommendations contained in the food pyramid - first employed in 1992.2
And virtually every American has experienced the federally supported
school lunch program. In the first half of 2011, these two iconic programs
underwent significant change as part of a stepped-up effort to improve the
health of the country through better food choices. Part I of this article
describes the "MyPlate" initiative that replaces the iconic USDA food
pyramid and menu revisions to the national school lunch and school
breakfast programs. This section also profiles administrative decisions in
two school districts to ban, on health grounds, brown-bag lunches in favor
of school-provided lunches. Finally, this section describes some of the
challenges of implementing a rule for chain restaurant menu labeling under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Part II of this article discusses several food safety issues, both
legislative and administrative, intended to minimize consumer vulnerability
to the increasing complex food supply chain.
Part III profiles four developments in food-related litigation. The
first, Seaside Farms v. United States, seeks compensation from the
government for negligently identifying tomatoes as the source of a 2008
Salmonella outbreak eventually traced to jalapeno peppers. Other litigation
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1. See Jeanne P. Goldberg, et al., The Obesity Crisis: Don't Blame it on the
Pyramid, 104 J. AM. DIET. AssoC. 1141, 1142 (2004) (describing history of dietary
guidance at the federal level).
2. See id. at 1141 (noting general awareness of the pyramid); John M. Kinney, The
US Department of Agriculture Food Pyramid; the birth and aging of an idea, 6
CURRENT OPINION IN CLINICAL NUTRITION AND METABOLIC CARE 9, 11-12 (2003)
(noting confusing recommendations).
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described below includes a claim for exposure to diacetyl through daily
consumption of microwave popcorn; a failure to label meat analogues
containing mycoprotein sourced from the cell protoplasm of the fungus
Fusarium venenatum, an alleged allergen; and a settlement in a multi-
district class action dispute regarding baby products containing Bisphenol
A.
This article concludes with a discussion of two significant
developments relating to biotechnology: the resolution of an injunction
prohibiting the planting of genetically engineered alfalfa and a multi-
million dollar settlement in the Liberty Link rice contamination class action
arising from the unauthorized commingling of genetically engineered rice.
As in previous editions of this update, necessity dictates that not every
change is included; rather, the authors limited their analysis to significant
changes within the broader context of food production, distribution, and
retail. The intent behind this series of updates is to provide a starting point
for scholars, practitioners, food scientists, and policy makers determined to
understand the shaping of food law in modern society. Tracing the
development of food law through these updates also builds an important
historical context for the overall progression of the discipline and hopefully
prompts further scholarship by others on many of these emerging issues.
I. HEALTH INITIATIVES
A. USDA's MyPlate
With substantial backing from Michelle Obama, the USDA recently
replaced its longstanding (and often maligned) food pyramid with a new
nutrition guide aimed at giving consumers easy-to-understand information
about daily food choices. The guide, called MyPlate, depicts a typical
consumer's daily food intake in the form of a dinner plate that graphically
illustrates the recommended daily proportions of grains, proteins, dairy
products, and fruits and veggies. If the consumer's actual plate mirrors that
of the MyPlate icon, then - in the words of the First Lady - "we're good;
it's as simple as that."3
The MyPlate icon already has garnered praise from nutrition
advocates for being much easier to use than the old food pyramid system.
A companion USDA website, www.choosemyplate.gov, elaborates upon
the MyPlate icon using simple, pithy directives: "[e]njoy your food, but eat
less," "[m]ake half your plate fruits and vegetables," and "[d]rink water
3. William Neuman, Nutrition Plate Unveiled, Replacing Food Pyramid, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2011, B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business/
03plate.html?_r-l1&scp=4&sq=myplate&st=cse.
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instead of sugary drinks." 4  The website's section on "empty calories"
helpfully juxtaposes foods with some empty calories (e.g., sweetened
applesauce; regular ground beef; whole milk) against companion foods that
have few or no empty calories (e.g., unsweetened applesauce; extra lean
ground beef; fat-free milk).
B. FDA's Menu Labeling Rules
While the USDA's MyPlate icon is perhaps nothing more than a
breezy effort to make consumers think more about the foods they eat on a
daily basis, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
recently engaged in formal rulemaking that aims to accomplish essentially
the same goal. The FDA's efforts will have real consequences for chain
restaurants throughout the United States, who will soon be required to
place calorie information on menus and display cases. 6  These menu
labeling requirements are part of a long-running effort by health and
nutrition advocates to curb the growing obesity epidemic in the United
States. About a third of the average American's daily caloric intake now
comes from food prepared outside the home, and studies have shown that
consumers often badly underestimate the number of calories in these
prepared foods. 7 But that is not to say that consumers do not want to know
how many calories are in their Big Macs and Whoppers: to the contrary, a
national telephone survey revealed that more than 70% of U.S. adults
supported the idea of listing calorie counts on restaurant menus.
Responding to this demand, some states and municipalities have enacted
menu labeling requirements for the chain restaurants within their
jurisdictions, but the laws' differing requirements have proven burdensome
for the chain restaurants that must comply with them.9
4. See CHOOSEMYPLATE.GOV, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
http://www.choosemyplate.gov/index.html (last visted Dec. 20, 2011).
5. Empty Calories, CHOOSEMYPLATE.GOV, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
http://www.choosemyplate.gov/foodgroups/emptycalories.html (last visited Dec 19,
2011).
6. See Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants
and Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,192, 19,192 (Apr. 6, 2011) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 11 and 101).
7. See id.
8. Id. at 19,193.
9. See id. (noting that "[s]ome jurisdictions required only calories on menus and
menu boards while others required additional nutrient declarations (e.g., variations of
the following: total grams of trans fat, grams of saturated fat, grams of carbohydrates,
and milligrams of sodium). Some State and local laws required a statement on menus
and menu boards regarding daily intake amounts for calories and other nutrients and
other laws did not require such a statement.").
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In response, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act' 0 amends
section 403(q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to
require "restaurants and similar retail food establishments that are part of a
chain with 20 or more locations doing business under the same name and
offering for sale substantially the same menu items . . . to provide calorie
information for standard menu items, including food on display and self-
service food."'' "Calorie information" means the number of calories
contained in each menu item as it is usually prepared, as well as a statement
suggesting daily caloric intake for contextual purposes.' 2 If this
information is not on the menu, then the food is misbranded under the
FFDCA. 13
The menu labeling provisions of the Affordable Care Act went into
effect upon the law's enactment in 2010, but the FDA has said that it does
not intend to enforce the self-executing provisions of the law until it
promulgates final regulations that more clearly delineate the scope of the
labeling requirements.14  This is perhaps a smart move, given the
definitional complexities that lay hidden beneath what appears to be a
rather simple requirement. Take, for example, an issue tackled by the
FDA's recent round of draft rulemaking: the definition of "retail food
establishment." The menu labeling provisions of the Affordable Care Act
apply only to foods offered for sale "in a restaurant or similar retail food
establishment that is part of a chain with 20 or more locations doing
business under the same name . . . and offering for sale substantially the
same menu items." 15 But what sort of places does Congress view as being
a restaurant or similar to it? Acknowledging that the term is ambiguous,
FDA proposes to define the phrase as "a retail establishment that offers for
sale restaurant or restaurant-type food, where the sale of food is the primary
business activity of that establishment."' 6 The "primary business activity"
requirement would be met if the establishment has either (1) held itself out
to the public as a restaurant, or (2) devotes more than 50% of its gross floor
10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
I1. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed Reg. 19,192, 19,193(Apr. 6, 2011) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 11 and 101).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 19,194 (noting that "[a]lthough these provisions became requirements
at the time the law was signed, FDA has previously announced that we intend to
exercise our enforcement discretion until the final rule is published and in effect.").
15. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H)(i) (2011) (emphasis added).
16. Food Labeling, Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,192, 19,197 (Apr. 6, 2011) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. II and 101).
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area to the preparation, purchase, service, consumption, or storage of
food. 1
This proposed definition seems sensible enough, but there is a
linguistic point worth emphasizing: FDA's proposed definition turns on an
establishment's sale of food in general, regardless of whether that food is
prepared restaurant-style. That means, for example, that grocery stores and
convenience stores would fall within the proposed definition of "restaurant
or similar retail food establishment" because, while they might not hold
themselves out as restaurants, more than 50% of their gross floor space is
devoted to the preparation, purchase, service, consumption, or storage of
food.' 8 Therefore, any "restaurant-type food" (generally defined by the
FDA as ready-to-eat food that is prepared in the establishment in question
and not for sale outside of it' 9) offered in grocery stores and convenience
stores that otherwise meet the law's requirements must label those items
with calorie information. As a less-inclusive alternative to its proposed
definition, the FDA has suggested "to define 'restaurant or similar retail
food establishment' to mean a retail establishment where the sale of
restaurant or restaurant-type food - as opposed to food in general - is the
primary business activity of that establishment." 20 That would by and large
exclude grocery and convenience stores, whose primary business activity is
selling food products to be prepared by consumers. The FDA seeks
comment on which of these definitions it should adopt.
If the FDA sticks with its proposed definition of "restaurant or similar
retail establishment," the result may be some thinly split hairs. The FDA
anticipates that "most movie theaters, amusement parks, general
merchandise stores with in-house concession stands, hotels, and
transportation carriers such as trains and airplanes" will not meet the
definition because they do not present themselves to the public as
restaurants (and they likely also would not meet the 50% floor space
requirement). 2 1 Furthermore, it is equally clear that chain restaurants
within larger establishments (e.g., Subway in a Walmart or Starbucks
inside a Barnes & Noble) will need to label their menu items with calorie
information, because they have locations outside of that larger
establishment.22 But what of the Target or Walmart Caf& - the little sit-
down dining area that serves hot dogs, nachos, and Icees? In its draft
17. See id
18. See id. at 19,198.
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(ii) (2011).
20. Food Labeling, Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,198.
21. See id. at 19,197.
22. See id at 19,198.
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guidance, FDA suggests that these restaurant-style areas would fall outside
of the menu labeling requirements because they are not part of a chain with
locations outside of the Target or Walmart.23  FDA would, therefore,
consider these eating areas to be part of the Target or Walmart itself, and
the question is whether the big-box store has presented itself as a restaurant
or devotes more than 50% of its floor space to food (likely not, on both
counts). 24  The FDA has asked for comments on whether these
establishments should fall within the scope of the labeling rule.
In any case, the definition of "restaurant or similar retail
establishment" matters, because once the FDA's menu labeling
requirements apply, they are quite broad. For example, FDA proposes to
define the "menu" or "menu board" that contains calorie information as the
"primary writing ... from which a consumer makes an order selection," no
matter where the consumer is physically located in proximity to the
25restaurant. That means that affected restaurants will need to put calorie
information not only on primary menus and menu boards inside the
restaurant, but also on drive-through menus, express window menus, take-
out menus, and even menus on the restaurant's website if consumers can
place orders via phone, fax, or online.26
The FDA further proposes to define "restaurant-type food" broadly to
include not only standard menu items,27 but also items routinely contained
in standing self-serve displays - for example, "[p]otato salad that is
routinely offered at a salad bar, pancakes that are routinely offered at a
buffet, and pudding that is routinely offered at a cafeteria line." 2 8 Under
the proposed rules, restaurants will need to place a sign next to each one of
these salad bar or buffet items stating the number of calories either per item
(e.g., a muffin or a baked potato) or per serving (e.g., potato salad or ice
cream).29 The same would go for pastries, ready-made sandwiches, or
23. See id. ("If... a facility selling restaurant or restaurant-type food is not part of a
chain with locations outside of the chain of the larger retail establishment, the facility
would be considered part of the larger retail establishment. For example, if Superstore
XYZ has a caf6 that appears only in the other locations of Superstore XYZ chain, the
cafe would be considered part of Superstore XYZ.").
24. See id.
25. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,201-202.
26. See id. at 19,201.
27. See id at 19,202 (defining standard menu items to include "combination meals,
variable menu items, self-service food, and food on display," but not custom orders,
daily specials, foods being test-marketed, and temporary menu items).
28. Id at 19,203.
29. See id. at 19,215. Per serving measurements can be done using the serving
utensil as the measure (e.g., 400 calories per scoop) or by common household
measurements (e.g., 400 calories per cup). Id.
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similar items for purchase from a display case. 3 0 The labeling rule even
reaches self-serve soda dispensers, which "must have calorie declarations
for each flavor or variety offered" and in amounts corresponding to the size
of the drink purchased (e.g., "140 calories per 12 ounces").3'
Given these requirements, it is interesting to examine FDA's cost-
benefit analysis of the proposed regulations. The agency estimates that its
new menu labeling rules would affect about 278,600 establishments
organized under 1,640 chains. 32 The mean aggregated start-up cost of
compliance with the regulations would be $315 million - or roughly $1,100
per restaurant - with mean ongoing costs of $44 million. 33 But will these
substantial costs be offset by lowered obesity rates? FDA admits that
"[flood choice and consumption decisions are complex," and that it is
"unaware of comprehensive data allowing accurate predictions of the effect
of the proposed requirements on consumer choice and establishment
menus." 34 Nevertheless, the agency has offered a ballpark break-even
estimate: FDA estimates that at least 0.06 percent of the adult obese
population would need to reduce their caloric intake by at least 100 calories
per week to break even on the mean annualized cost of the regulations.
Current U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data
indicate that 34% of the U.S. population - or roughly 105 million people -
are obese,36 which means that if only 6,300 obese Americans reduce their
caloric intake by 100 each week each year, the economy won't lose a dime
on FDA's menu-labeling investment. While such bureaucratic number-
crunching is often impossible to objectively confirm, the menu-labeling
rules are a positive step forward in shifting consumer preferences toward
more healthy fare at chain restaurants. When a McDonald's patron sees
"790 calories" prominently displayed next to the Angus Bacon and Cheese
burger on the menu board, she may pick the company's 290-calorie
southwest grilled chicken salad instead,37 and McDonald's may alter its
menu offerings accordingly in the face of this evolving demand.
30. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,215.
31. See id. at 19,216.
32. See id. at 19,222.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 19,223.
35. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and
Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,223.
36. See id. at 19,192.
37. See McDonald's USA Nutrition Facts for Popular Menu Items, MCDONALD'S,
http://nutrition.mcdonalds.com/getnutrition/nutritionfacts.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,
2011).
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C. USDA's Revisions to the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs
The federal government has long targeted obesity as a national
concern, but it has recently focused on combating that problem in
children. 38 CDC data suggest that about 32% of children and adolescents
aged 2 to 19 are overweight, and countless studies have linked childhood
obesity to adulthood health problems like heart disease, diabetes, strokes,
and high blood pressure." Naturally, one of the key risk factors associated
with obesity at any age is caloric intake, and for children, one of the main
daily sources of calories - whether good or bad - is the breakfast and lunch
programs in the nation's school systems. The problem is these meals do
not always provide children with the healthy food needed to combat
obesity. A 2007 report by the USDA indicates that under current school
menu planning, fewer than one-third of school lunches offered in the 2004-
2005 school year met program requirements of less than 10% of total
calories from saturated fat. 4 0 A report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
found that "children's consumption of whole grains is extremely low in
comparison with the Dietary Guidelines recommendation that half of all
grains consumed [should be] whole grains."4 1 Current school lunch
regulations allow schools to serve whole and reduced-fat (2%) milk
without restriction, but do not require schools to offer the quantities of
fruits and vegetables recommended by the 2005 Dietary Guidelines for
Americans.42 Finally, school meals also have extremely high levels of
sodium-lunches in particular average 1,400 mg of sodium, according to
one report.43
Therefore, the USDA issued significant draft revisions to its National
School Lunch Program (NLSP) and School Breakfast Program (SBP) in
38. See, e.g., A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, United States Food Law
Update: The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Obesity, and Deceptive Labeling
Enforcement, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 135, 139-41 (2011) (outlining key provisions of the
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010).
39. See Food Labeling, Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants
and Similar Retail Food Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. at 19,192.
40. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 2494, 2496 (Jan. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 210
and 220).
41. Id
42. See id. at 2495-96.
43. Id. at 2502 (noting that the average sodium content of all school lunches is more
than 1,400 mg).
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order to align them with the recommendations set forth by the 2005 Dietary
Guidelines for Americans.44 In particular:
The proposed standards for menu planning improve the
school meals' alignment with the 2005 Dietary Guidelines
by offering more fruits at breakfast; increasing the amount
and variety of vegetables at lunch; offering more whole-
grain rich foods; limiting fluid milk choices to fat-free
(unflavored or flavored) and unflavored fluid low-fat milk;
establishing minimum and maximum calorie levels for
each age/grade group; increasing the emphasis on limiting
saturated fat; seeking gradual but major reductions in the
sodium content; and minimizing trans fat.45
To help it implement the 2005 Dietary Guidelines into the NSLP and
the SBP, USDA turned to the IOM, an independent, nonprofit arm of the
National Academy of Sciences that provides "unbiased and authoritative"
health advice to the public and policymakers.4 6 At USDA's request, IOM
conducted an independent review of the nutritional needs of school-aged
children in the U.S. using both the 2005 Dietary Guidelines and its own
Dietary Reference Intake (DRI) reports.47 Based on this review, IOM "set
targets for 24 nutrients and other dietary components that serve as a
scientific basis for the proposed standards for menu planning." 4 8 However,
schools will not use these nutrient targets to plan their own menus; rather,
the crux of the revamped program are the new "food-based meal patterns"
(FBMP) developed by IOM that incorporate the 24 nutritional targets.49
There are two main patterns - one for breakfast and one for lunch - and
each sets minimum daily values for fruits, vegetables, grains, meats, and
fluid milk, while also capping the total number of calories per meal.50 The
daily values vary by three different age groups: Grades K-5, Grades 6-8,
and Grades 9-12.5 So long as school menu planners stick within the
44. See id at 2494.
45. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2496-97.
46. See About the IOM, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last visited July 19, 2011).
47. See Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2496.
48. Id. at 2497.
49. See id. at 2497-98.
50. See id. at 2498.
51. Id.
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patterns recommended by IOM, they should be in compliance with
USDA's nutritional requirements.
In order to carry out these new FBMPs, the proposed rule
recommends a significant change in how the NSLP and NBP are operated.
Currently, there are five menu planning approaches schools may use when
planning school breakfasts and lunches: two follow the FBMP approach,
two follow the nutrient standard menu planning (NSMP) approach (which
uses computer modeling), and one allows for individualized modification
of either the FBMP or the NSMP. 52 The proposed regulations eliminate the
NSMP approaches in favor of a FBMP-only approach; no other menu
planning approaches would be permitted. USDA estimates that a single
menu plan will not only simplify operations (70% of U.S. schools already
use the FBMP approach), but will also better effect USDA's goals by
requiring schools to stay within the new dietary guidelines established by
IOM.54
In setting calorie limits for its school meal programs, USDA noted
that it was "mindful of the childhood obesity trend and the food choices
available to school children outside of [school meals]."5 Therefore, the
minimum and maximum calorie levels for school lunches and breakfasts
take into consideration the meals and snacks kids eat when they are not in
school - food that in many cases is less healthy than what the government
prescribes for breakfast and lunch. The recommended calorie ranges are
fairly narrow - there's a 100-calorie variance between the upper and lower
limits at lunch, and a 150-calorie range at breakfast.5 6 The USDA states
that the goal of the calorie ranges "is not to reduce children's intake of
food, but to avoid excessive calories," and that its guidelines "leave
",57relatively few discretionary calories for fats and added sugars.
52. See Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2495.
53. Id. at 2499.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 2501.
56. See id.
57. Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2501.
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D. Wanna Brown-Bag It? Not At This Chicago School
The upshot of the USDA's revised school meal guidelines seems
clear: less wiggle room for school administrators to fill breakfasts and
lunches with unhealthy food choices. Of course, there is another way for
kids to get all the bologna, potato chips, and Twinkies they want - pack a
bag lunch. And that is why one Chicago school has taken the drastic step
of banning all homemade lunches, instead requiring its pupils to sign on to
the federally-funded school meal programs.s Chicago Public Schools has
no formal policy on brown bag lunches, leaving the decision up to the
principal at each school.59 The principal at Little Village Academy on
Chicago's West Side enacted the homemade lunch ban after she saw
students "bring 'bottles of soda and flaming hot chips' on field trips for
their lunch."60 Another school on Chicago's South Side allows students to
bring bag lunches but apparently dispatches the food constabulary to
"confiscate any snacks loaded with sugar or salt." 61 A spokeswoman for
Chicago Public Schools defended Little Village's policy in the Chicago
Tribune, stating that the school's principal "is encouraging the healthier
choices and attempting to make an impact that extends beyond the
classroom." 62
However, not everyone is thrilled with the policy. For parents who do
not qualify for free or reduced-price school meals, homemade lunches can
be less expensive than the fixed-price school programs.63 And for picky
eaters, no home lunches may mean no lunch at all: the Chicago Tribune
described a lunchtime scene at Little Village in which "dozens of students
took the [required school] lunch but threw most of it into the garbage
uneaten."64 But the rottenest tomato that can be lobbed at homemade lunch
bans is that they do not allow kids and their parents to make good food
decisions. Vegans and vegetarians certainly suffer - the NSLP and NBP
mandate servings of protein but do not allow for tofu because it does not
have a federal standard of identity.6 s Children with food allergies may
58. See Monica Eng and Joel Hood, Chicago School Bans Some Lunches Brought






63. See Eng and Hood, supra note 58.
64. Id.
65. See Nutrition Standards in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. at 2501.
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have to wrangle with school administrators for an exception to the policy.66
And finally, the brown-bag lunch ban does not allow children to learn to
take responsibility for making wise food choices. When asked by a
reporter what he would bring for lunch if he were able, Little Village
student Gerardo Ramos - only a second-grader - responded: "I would bring
a banana, orange, and some grapes."67
II. FOOD SAFETY INITIATIVES
Food safety has been a long-running topic in these Food Law
Updates, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has continued
to include the topic in its "High Risk Series" reports.6' But the issue has
taken on new resonance in light of an E. coli outbreak that spread
throughout Europe in May and June, killing 49 people and sickening at
least 4,100 more. 69 The outbreak involved a rare, mutated strain of E. coli
that officials suspect originated from organic fenugreek seeds shipped from
Egypt and used to grow sprouts in Germany.70 The European outbreak also
laid bare the formidable food safety challenges posed by an increasingly
global and industrialized food system. First, the E. coli strain proved
highly resistant to antibiotic treatment, suggesting it had originated in
growing fields with the high levels of antibiotic use often found in
industrial-scale farming.7' Second, global supply chains have made
traceback vexingly difficult. Eleven tons of the suspect seeds were shipped
from Egypt to a distributor in Germany that resold the seeds to 54
companies in Germany and 16 companies in 11 other European countries,
and officials still had not accounted for another five tons of the seeds as of
late July. 72
Though the European outbreak largely spared the United States, it
illustrates the need for continuing food safety efforts in all corners of the
globe. Following on the passage of the Food Safety Modernization Act in
66. See Eng and Hood, supra note 58.
67. Id.
68. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-184, HIGH-RISK SERIES:
AN UPDATE Ill (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
dl 1278.pdf.
69. See William Neuman, A Search Is Underway For Tainted Sprout Seeds, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2011, B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/
business/06seeds.html?_r-1&ref=foodsafety.
70. See id.
71. See Tom Randall and Catherine Larkin, Europe E. Coli Is Deadliest Outbreak as
Rare Strain Causes Kidney Failure, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 3, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-03/e-coli-outbreak-in-europe-reaches-
deadliest-on-record-with-kidney-failure.html.
72. See Neuman, supra note 69.
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early 2011, U.S. policymakers have continued their efforts to ensure the
safety and integrity of the U.S. food supply. A few of these efforts are
detailed briefly below.
A. Senate passes bill that would increase penalties for willful food safety
violators
In the midst of a Salmonella outbreak investigation at his company,
Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) president Stewart Parnell sent an
email to FDA officials begging them to allow the company to stay in
business, noting that PCA "desperately at least need[s] to turn the raw
peanuts on our floor into money."" The company subsequently went
bankrupt - a direct consequence of the outbreak that FDA traced to
unsanitary conditions at PCA's plant, which killed eight people and
sickened nearly 600 more. 74 Reaction in Congress to the flagrant food
safety violations in PCA's plants was justifiably harsh: "I'd like to see
some people go to jail," Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) told the Los Angeles
Times.7 1
Now, thanks to Senator Leahy, prison time may be a possibility for
those who willfully or recklessly disregard food safety laws. Senate Bill
216, introduced by the Senator and several co-sponsors in April, amends
Section 333 of Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to prescribe prison
time for knowing or reckless violations of the Act's prohibitions on
adulterated or misbranded food. Violations of the Act with intent to
defraud or mislead are already punishable by prison time under § 333,n but
Senator Leahy's bill increases the penalty for such violations from a three-
year maximum to a ten-year maximum.78 The bill also reduces the level of
mens rea necessary for imprisonment under § 333 by providing that those
who act "with conscious or reckless disregard of death or serious bodily
injury" may also go to prison for up to ten years.79 The bill passed the
73. Gardiner Harris, Peanut Products Sent Out Before Tests, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 12,
2009, A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/health/policy
/12peanut.html?hp.
74. Ben Meyerson, Senators Rebuke Federal Regulators in Peanut-Borne
Salmonella Outbreak, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, http://articles.latimes.corn/2009/
feb/06/nation/na-peanut-fda6.
75. Id.
76. See S. 216, 112th Cong. (2011).
77. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2011).
78. S. 216, 112th Cong., § 2 (2011).
79. See id
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Senate by unanimous consent in April, but the House has yet to act on the
legislation as of this writing.80
B. FDA issues first administrative regulations under FSMA
The FDA has issued its first administrative regulations under the
watershed Food Safety Modernization Act signed into law by President
Obama in early 2011.81 The first regulation involves a change to the
criteria by which FDA can order administrative detention of food that it
suspects to be adulterated or misbranded. The Bioterrorism Act of 200282
gave FDA the authority to order administrative detention of any article of
food "if during an inspection, examination, or investigation an FDA officer
or qualified employee finds there is credible evidence or information
indicating that the article of food presents a threat of serious health
consequences or death to humans or animals." Section 207 of the FSMA,
however, loosens that language and an FDA official may now
administratively detain food during an inspection "if there is reason to
believe that an article of food is adulterated or misbranded."84  The
substantive changes thus are twofold: (1) the "credible information or
evidence" has been substituted for the mushier "reason to believe" as
sufficient knowledge to trigger detention; and (2) the inspector need not
show a threat of "serious health consequences or death" - just that the food
may violate the law.
The actual consequences of this change, however, are so far unknown
- in large part because FDA has yet to exercise its administrative detention
authority in the nine years since the Bioterrorism Act's passage.85
Nevertheless, under the new standard, FDA believes that it will be more
likely to use its administrative detention powers - and especially in
situations where "the use of, or exposure to, a violative product may cause
temporary or medically reversible adverse health consequences or where
the probability of serious adverse health consequences is remote." 86 In
80. See Bill Summary & Status Search, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d 112:1:./temp/~bdBDGm:@@@X|/home/
LegislativeData.php| (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
81. See, e.g., Endres & Johnson, supra note 38, at 136-39 (outlining the major food
safety provisions of the FSMA).
82. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 (2002).
83. Criteria Used to Order Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal
Consumption, 76 Fed. Reg. 25,538, 25,539 (May 5, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 1).
84. Id. at 25,538.
85. See id. at 25,540.
86. Id
396 [VOL. 7
UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE
other words, the new FSMA provisions give FDA the authority to go
further out on a limb to address less serious-but still potentially harmful-
violations of the FDCA. That approach is consistent with the policy goals
of the FSMA, which are to enable "FDA to focus more on preventing food
safety problems rather than relying primarily on reacting to problems after
they occur."87
The second regulation involves a change to FDA's imported food
notification procedures. Section 801(m) of the FDCA requires anyone
importing food into the United States to submit to the FDA prior notice of
that importation so that the agency may inspect the food before it enters the
U.S.88 Before the FSMA's passage, that notice was to include a description
of: (1) the article of food itself; (2) the manufacturer and shipper of the
article; (3) the grower of the article; (4) the country of origin; (5) the
county from which the article is shipped; and (6) the anticipated port of
entry. 89 Current FDA regulations add a number of detailed requirements to
the statutory list.90 Section 304 of the FSMA adds a seventh statutory
requirement: "any country to which the article has been refused entry," 91
and so FDA's Interim Final Rule simply amends the agency's own
regulations to reflect that change. FDA expects that requiring notice of
prior refusals will help the agency to "better identify imported food
shipments that may pose safety and security risks to U.S. consumers."92
C. New FDA recall search engine allows consumers to track product
recalls
In April, FDA completed another one of its FSMA mandated tasks.
Specifically, Section 206 of the FSMA required FDA to add a "consumer-
friendly" search engine that tracks both ongoing and completed recalls.
93
FDA consulted with consumer groups such as the Consumers Union, Food
Marketing Institute, Grocery Manufacturers Association, and the Pew
Health Group on ways to easily communicate recall information to
consumers. 94 The result is a searchable online database that organizes
87. Id. at 25,538.
88. 21 U.S.C. § 381(m) (2011).
89. Id.
90. See Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services,
21 C.F.R. § 1.281 (2010).
91. Criteria Used to Order Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal
Consumption, 76 Fed. Reg. at 25,542.
92. Id. at 25,543.
93. See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 206 (2011).
94. See Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Launches
Consumer-Friendly Web Search for Consumers During Recalls (Apr. 4, 2011),
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recalls by date, product brand name, product description, and the reason for
recall.95  Consumers can view all FDA recalls, or they can click on
different tabs to see recalls for food, drugs, animal health, biologics, and
medical devices. 9 6 Helpfully, most food product recall notices also include
a picture of the recalled product's label and a link to a company-issued
press release announcing the recall. 97
D. USDA proposes new "test and hold" procedure for meat and poultry
The USDA has introduced a proposed rule that would change the way
the agency inspects meat and poultry products for harmful pathogens under
the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) 98 and the Poultry Products
Inspection Act (PPIA). 99 Under current law, the USDA's Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) periodically tests sample lots of meat and poultry
at federally-inspected slaughterhouses for the presence of Salmonella, E.
coli, Listeria monocytogenes, and other harmful pathogens. 0o The FMIA
and PPIA require meat and poultry products to bear a certification mark
before they are introduced into interstate commerce; that mark signifies
that the meat has been inspected and is free from adulteration. 101
Currently, FSIS recommends, but does not require, that individual
slaughterhouses hold all meat products sampled by FSIS until negative test
results are received.' 02 But because producers may ship meat before
sample test results are available, meat products contaminated with harmful
pathogens may, in some cases, enter into the food supply.
In fact, that situation is precisely what led FSIS to change its rule.
Although the agency has considered a "test and hold" requirement since
available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm249437.htm.
95. See Recalls, Market Withdrawals, & Safety Alerts, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG




98. The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) authorizes the USDA to license and
inspect meat production facilities that ship in interstate commerce. See Federal Meat
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2011).
99. The Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) authorizes the USDA to license and
inspect poultry production facilities that ship in interstate commerce. See Poultry
Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-471 (2011).
100. See Not Applying the Mark of Inspection Pending Certain Test Results, 76 Fed.
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2002,103 recent recall data appears to have been the catalyst for change.
FSIS reports that as a result of its testing procedures, there were 14 recalls
in 2007, 19 in 2008, and 11 in 2009, with the bulk of them involving E. coli
and Listeria monocytogenes bacteria.1 0 4  Apparently, "[t]hese recalls
occurred because the establishments that produced the product that tested
positive released the product into commerce while test results were
pending."'0o
The agency's own numbers suggests that the problem is not quite
epidemic: across establishment size, "between 79 percent and 100 percent
of establishments already hold product pending test results."' 06  The
agency's proposed mandatory test-and-hold requirement therefore
represents an effort to corral the laggards in the bottom twenty percent.
Nevertheless, FSIS's data show that many of the establishments not
voluntarily holding meat and poultry pending testing results qualify as
small and very small establishments,10 7 and the National Meat Association
(NMA) has asked FSIS to analyze the consequences of its rule on these
producers in two contexts: (1) in cases where the establishment's products
have a shelf life less than the amount of time required to complete testing,
and (2) in cases where the establishment makes same-day deliveries to
buyers. 08 FSIS believes it can minimize hardship in those cases by giving
establishments advance notice of inspection (something it already does) so
that they can produce and set aside an adequate amount of meat for
testing. 109
E. FSIS announces final rules for cooperative state meat and poultry
inspection programs
USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) promulgated
final regulations that will allow certain state-inspected meat and poultry
processors to ship their products in interstate commerce. Qualifying state-
inspected establishments must meet all Federal standards under the FMIA
and PPIA.
FSIS's rule adds a third cooperative state-federal meat inspection
regime to the agency's already-existing procedures. Generally, the FMIA
and the PPIA authorize FSIS to work with state agencies to develop meat
103. See id.
104. See id at 19,954.
105. Not Applying the Mark of Inspection Pending Certain Test Results, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 19,954
106. Id at 19,959.
107. See id. (Table 3).
108. See id. at 19,955.
109. See id
3992011]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
or poultry inspection programs. "0 These cooperative inspection regimes
require standards "at least equal to" Federal programs, and they apply to
meat and poultry produced and sold within the State."' In addition, the
Talmadge-Aiken Act authorizes FSIS to enter into separate agreements
with State agencies to conduct meat, poultry, and egg inspections on behalf
of FSIS." 2 These programs also operate only intrastate." 3 The 2008 Farm
Bill1 4 amendments to the FMIA and PPIA added new sections that
"supplement the existing cooperative State meat and poultry inspection
programs by establishing a new cooperative program under which certain
State-inspected establishments would be permitted to ship meat and poultry
products in interstate commerce,"' and bear the USDA's federally-
inspected certification mark." 6
The FSIS final rule describes the requirements for this voluntary
cooperative interstate inspection regime." 7 In general, a meat or poultry
processor may participate in the State-inspected interstate shipment
program if it: (1) submits a request to be considered for the program; I1" (2)
employs no more than 25 employees as that term is defined in the
regulations;" 9 (3) is in compliance with all the requirements under the
cooperative State inspection programs authorized by the FMIA and
PPIA; 120 and (4) is otherwise in compliance with the implementing
regulations for the interstate shipping program. 121
110. See 21 U.S.C. § 661 (2011); 21 U.S.C. § 454 (2011); see also Cooperative
Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry Products, 74 Fed. Reg.
47,648, 47,648 (Sept. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 321, 332, and 381).
111. 21 U.S.C. § 661(a)(1) and § 454(a)(1).
112. See 7 U.S.C. § 450 (2011); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FSIS
DIRECTIVE, 5720.2 REVISION 3, STATE COOPERATIVE INSPECTION PROGRAMS (Nov. 16,
2004).
113. See Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Products, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,648 (noting that under the Talmadge-Aiken Act, FSIS
"enters into a separate agreement with a State agency for the State program to conduct
meat, poultry, or eggs products inspection or other regulatory activities on behalf of
FSIS.").
114. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 112
Stat. 1651 (June 18, 2008).
115. Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Products, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,648.
116. Id.
117. See Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Product; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,714, 24,715 (May 2, 201 1)(to be codified at 9
CFR Parts 321, 332, and 381).
118. See id. at 24,753-54; 24, 757.
119. See id. at 24,753-54; 24756-57.
120. See id. at 24,754; 24,757.
121. See id.
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The new inspection regime seems aimed at encouraging more small
businesses to ship their meat and poultry across state lines by increasing the
number of available slaughtering facilities. Establishments that already
ship their products interstate may not participate in the new cooperative
program.12 2 However, though the new interstate inspection program is
separate from the intrastate cooperative programs, the proposed FSIS
regulations allow a facility to participate in both, so long as "the
establishment implements and maintains written procedures for complete
physical separation of product and process for each operation by time or
space." 2 3
III. LITIGATION
A. Tomato producer alleges FDA was negligent in implicating tomatoes in
2008 Salmonella outbreak
The regulatory developments outlined in section II of this Food Law
Update suggest that FDA plans to exercise an abundance of caution when it
comes to food safety outbreaks. The problem with acting in the face of
uncertainty and incomplete information is that sometimes the agency gets it
wrong and innocent parties get blamed. At least that is the general idea
behind a complaint filed in South Carolina federal court by Seaside Farms,
a tomato producer that alleges the FDA acted negligently in fingering
tomatoes as the source of a 2008 Salmonella outbreak eventually traced to
jalapeno peppers.12 4
The complaint, filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act,125 pleads
several causes of action, including negligence, defamation, and a Fifth
Amendment takings claim - as well as violations of South Carolina
consumer protection laws.126 The crux of the negligence claim is that the
FDA owes a duty to Seaside to act in a way that is not reckless, and that the
FDA was "negligent, grossly negligent, and reckless" in, inter alia: (1)
failing to identify any contaminated tomatoes in South Carolina before
issuing a nationwide recall for tomatoes;127 (2) failing to verify reports of
Salmonella due to consumption of tomatoes before issuing a nationwide
122. See Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Products, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,649.
123. See Cooperative Inspection Programs: Interstate Shipment of Meat and Poultry
Product; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,755, 24,759.
124. Complaint at 6-7, Seaside Farms v. United States, No. 1l-cv-1199-CWH
(D.S.C. May 18, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint].
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.; Complaint supra note 124, at 1.
126. See Complaint, supra note 124, at 5, 7-8.
127. Id. at 6.
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tomato recall;128 (3) "failing to follow FDA standards and practices with
regard to tomatoes and without regard to the processes of food
supervision;" 2 9 and (4) issuing a nationwide tomato recall and then
subsequently identifying tomatoes from 41 states as safe.13 0 The complaint
alleges that Seaside has always been in cooperation with FDA audits and
did not source any contaminated tomatoes at any time during the recall.' 3'
Commentators have cited the 2008 Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak as
a communications failure between the CDC, FDA, and state departments of
health.132  On May 31, 2008, the CDC first informed FDA about an
outbreak of Salmonella thought to be associated with tomatoes. FDA's
investigation therefore initially focused on raw tomatoes, and its early
public statements suggested that "raw red plum, red Roma and round red
tomatoes [were] the likely suspect food."' 33  But by mid-July, jalapeno
peppers linked to a single Texas distributor had been pinpointed as the
source of the outbreak. 134 Though FDA had lifted its warning on eating
tomatoes by this time, the damage to the tomato industry had been done -
to the tune of an estimated $200 million in economic losses.'3 1 One
postmortem analysis concluded that "[t]he outbreak response was marked
by a lack of organization, capacity, and coordination that calls into the
question the public-health effectiveness of the response. Finally, messages
to the public were often mixed, if not contradictory."1
36
But from a liability perspective, the picture is muddy. It is not just
that other actors besides the FDA, such as the CDC and state departments




131. Complaint, supra note 124, at 3.
132. See Nathan M. Trexler, "Market" Regulation: Confronting Industrial
Agriculture's Food Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 335 (2011); Sara M.
Benson, Guidance for Improving the Federal Response to Foodborne Illness Outbreaks
Associated With Fresh Produce, 65 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 503, 510 (2010); Elizabeth A.
Trachtman, Note, Food-Borne Illnesses Strike U.S. Food Supply: A Discussion of
Inadequate Safety Procedures and Regulations in the U.S. and Abroad, 20 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 385, 404 (2010); Produce Safety Project, Breakdown: Lessons To Be
Learned From the 2008 Salmonella Saintpaul Outbreak (Nov. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.producesafetyproject.org/admin/assets/files/0015.pdf. [hereinafter Produce
Safety Project].
133. Produce Safety Project, supra note 132, at 10.
134. See Benson, supra note 132, at 510.
135. Id
136. Produce Safety Project, supra note 132, at 17.
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organizations can control the market reaction to the recall. 13 7 One report
noted that, given the agencies' lack of consistent messaging as to the source
and scope of the contamination, "[i]t should not have been surprising ...
that several large retail outlets pulled tomatoes off their shelves and out of
their menu items in the middle of the outbreak, and consumers stopped
eating all types of tomatoes," even though FDA had consistently said that
certain types of tomatoes were safe to eat. 13 8  This type of market
overreaction is typical in the early stages of foodborne illness outbreaks:
during the 2006 E. coli outbreak in fresh spinach, the bottom dropped out
of the entire spinach market even though the FDA later clarified that
canned and frozen spinach was safe to eat;' 3 9 during the 2011 E. coli
outbreak in Europe, Russia announced a complete ban on all produce
sourced from Europe. 140
To the extent that it reaches the merits, the viability of the Seaside
litigation will likely turn upon the discovery process: What did the
government know about tomato contamination, and when? How did it
communicate this information to other food safety officials? Did those
actions or non-actions amount to negligence? The Seaside case is an
interesting illustration of what happens when the interests of commodity
producers collide with the precautionary principle that underlies safety
regulation. In the regulation context, risk management often involves
making complex judgments about the available science, the underlying
harm, and the number of lives that may be put at risk if regulation does not
occur. Agencies weigh these factors and then come up with the appropriate
"amount" of proactive regulation to address the harm. The problem with
the U.S. food safety regime, however, is that it is largely reactive rather
than proactive. Given limited agency resources and the sporadic nature of
pathogenic outbreaks, FDA and CDC can only scramble to put out fires,
sometimes applying water cannons to problems that need only fire
extinguishers.
137. For a good introduction to the topic of so-called "veggie libel" laws designed to
protect the economic interests of small agricultural producers, see David J. Bederman,
et. al., Of Banana Bills and Veggie Hate Crimes: The Constitutionality ofAgricultural
Disparagement Statutes, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (1997).
138. Produce Safety Project, supra note 132, at 11.
139. See A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, Integrating Stakeholder Roles in
Food Production, Marketing, and Safety Systems: An Evolving Multi-Jurisdictional
Approach, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 29,56, n. 137 (2011) (describing the FDA's
contradictory messages throughout the spinach recall).
140. See Russia bans fresh European produce, state media report, CNN WORLD (Jun.
2, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-02/world/russia.e.coli 1 russia-bans-coli-
vegetables?_s=PM:WORLD.
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The recent developments discussed in this Update - in particular, the
provisions that allow FDA to detain food if it has "reason to believe" that it
violates the FDCA, as well as FSIS's new "test-and-hold" procedures - are
incremental steps toward a more proactive food safety regime. So long as
they are bolstered by adequate funding for enforcement, these new
procedures may help food safety officials stop contaminated jalapenos from
ever being released into the marketplace, or prevent an entire commodity
industry from bearing the consequences of the actions of a minor segment.
B. Federal district judge denies summary judgment in consumer's diacetyl
microwave popcorn suit
A federal district judge in Colorado has denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment in a suit by a consumer who alleges that
microwave popcorn caused his respiratory ailments. According to the
complaint in Watson v. Dillon Companies, Inc.,141 Wayne Watson ate two
to three bags of the defendants' microwave popcorn at his home on a daily
basis for about seven years.142 Doctors subsequently diagnosed him with a
rare lung condition called brochiolitis obliterans, which is primarily
characterized by small airway obstruction that causes shortness of breath
even upon mild exertion and does not respond to the use of an inhaled
bronchodilator.143 Watson filed his claim under the Colorado Consumer
Protection Act, alleging that the defendants either knew or should have
known that their microwave popcorn was unreasonably dangerous, and
they failed to provide material facts about the risks of the product to the
popcorn-consuming public. 144
The basis for the claim is a series of studies linking exposure to
vapors from the flavorings used in microwave popcorn production - and in
particular diacetyl, a chemical used in artificial butter flavoring - to
decreased lung functioning in popcorn plant workers.14 5 These studies
have shown that "the highest levels of [diacetyl] release occur when
opening the bag after popping,"l 4 6 and researchers have "issued
recommendations for reducing exposures in the workplace, including better
exhaust and ventilation, closed production systems, personal protective
141. 2011 WL 2490963 (D. Colo. June 22, 2011) (slip. op.).
142. Id. at *1.
143. See id. at *5.
144. Id. at *18.
145. Id at *3. For a comprehensive history of the so-called "popcorn lung crisis" and
a critique of the regulatory response to it, see Andrew Scott Dulberg, The Popcorn
Lung Case Study: A Recipe for Regulation?, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 87
(2009).
146. Watson, 2011 WL 2490963 at *3.
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equipment, and removal of diacetyl as an ingredient in butter flavoring."l47
Put generally, Watson claims that his respiratory condition was caused by
his excessive consumption of microwave popcorn,14 8 and that the evidence
of respiratory problems in microwave popcorn plant workers should have
put the defendants on notice that their product was unreasonably dangerous
for consumers.1 49
The bulk of the court's analysis consisted of a Daubert analysis 50 of
the plaintiffs' medical experts, which it resolved largely in the plaintiffs'
favor.15 ' Based mainly on the strength of the proffered expert testimony,
the court also concluded that the plaintiffs had offered enough evidence to
survive a motion for summary judgment on the issue of causation.15 That
being said, however, causation may yet be an issue if and when the case (or
others like it) comes before a jury. Although the studies that examined
diacetyl exposure in microwave popcorn plant workers have established a
clear relationship between butter flavorings and respiratory conditions, the
Watson court noted that "there remain numerous unanswered questions
about what level of exposure triggers health effects and whether such
effects are caused by peak or by cumulative exposures."' 53 Many of the
studies cited by the plaintiffs had examined the effects of diacetyl exposure
on plant quality control workers who popped and then opened bags of
microwave popcorn to determine the number of unpopped kernels and
other quality issues.154 The plaintiff in the Watson case claims that his
exposure "is more similar to that of QC workers, who pop and open
popcorn in the same manner as consumers, albeit at much greater rates."' 55
The defendants in Watson argue that "the studies of QC workers are
inapplicable because of the significantly higher number of bags popped per
day (often a hundred or more compared to Mr. Watson's two or three) and
variations in the workplace assignments and environments." 5 6
While that argument was not a winning one for purposes of a Daubert
expert testimony analysis, it could very well sway a jury. Indeed, at least
two other consumer lawsuits alleging injury from diacetyl exposure in
147. Id. at *4.
148. Seeid.at*16
149. Id. at*19.
150. The standard for admissibility of expert testimony is primarily governed by the
Supreme Court's holding in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
151. See Watson, 2011 WL 2490963 at *9-* 17.
152. Id. at *18.
153. Id. at *4.
154. Id. at *1.
155. Id. at *4.
156. Watson, 2011 WL 2490963, at *12.
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microwave popcorn have been litigated; one was dismissed on motions 157
and the other resulted in the jury verdict for the defendant corporation.
The district court in Newkirk v. ConAgra Foods excluded broad swaths of
testimony from Dr. David Egilman, an expert upon whom the Watson
plaintiffs rely, on grounds that it was not sufficiently reliable and then
dismissed the case on summary judgment motions; 159 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in June. 60
While juries in several states have awarded multimillion dollar
verdicts to popcorn plant workers who claimed that their respiratory
conditions were caused by exposure to diacetyl,161 they have not been so
generous to consumers making the same claims. The first such claim to
reach a jury, Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, resulted in a verdict for ConAgra
on all counts.162 After the verdict, a defense attorney in the Khoury case
opined that plaintiffs' attorneys in consumer diacetyl cases are "trying to
take the regular popcorn consumer and turn them into a popcorn
worker .... Some enterprising attorneys got involved and decided to bring
it into your kitchen whether the science is there or not." 63
C. State court judge rules that mycoprotein allergy claims are preempted
by federal labeling rules
A circuit court judge in Connecticut has dismissed a suit by a
consumer who claims that a maker of vegetarian chicken patties should
157. See Newkirk v. ConAgra Foods, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (E.D. Wash. 2010); aff'd,
2011 WL 2421144 (9th Cir. June 17, 2011) (unpublished).
158. See Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 0816-cv-31620 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Jackson
County Aug. 2, 2010).
159. See Newkirk, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 ("There is simply too great an analytical
gap between the existing data, indicating that exposure to butter flavoring vapors in the
occupational setting can cause bronchiolitis obliterans, and Dr. Egilman's opinion that
a consumer of microwave popcorn is exposed to a vaporized substance equivalent to
production plant butter flavoring vapors at levels sufficient to cause bronchiolitis
obliterans . . . . His opinion testimony, therefore, is inadmissible under Daubert and
Fed.R.Evid. 702.").
160. Newkirk v. ConAgra Foods, 2011 WL 2421144 (9th Cir. June 17, 2011).
161. See Alyson E. Raletz, Regular Popcorn Snacker's Lawsuit Over Lung Condition
Starts In, FINDARTICLES (July 6, 2010), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi 7992/is
20100706/ai n54413207/; see also Jeff Lehr, Illinois Worker Wins $30 Million Verdict
in Diacetyl Popcorn Chemical Lawsuit, THE JOPLIN GLOBE (Aug. 16, 2010),
http://www.joplinglobe.com/local/x369041172/Illinois-worker-wins-30-million-
verdict-in-diacetyl-popcorn-chemical-lawsuit.
162. Khoury, No. 0816-cv-31620.
163. Alyson E. Raletz, In Jackson County Circuit Court, Consumer Loses 'Popcorn
Lung' Case, FINDARTICLES (July 30, 2010), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi 7992/
is 20100730/ai n55294593/.
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have warned her that the product contained a food allergen. Plaintiff Kathy
Cardinale filed a lawsuit against defendant Quorn Foods, claiming the
mycoprotein in the company's vegetarian "Chik'n Patties" was the cause of
her food-allergy-related injuries.1 64 The suit alleged violations of
Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),1 65 which prohibits
"unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce."l66
Mycoprotein is sourced from the cell protoplasm of the fungus
Fusarium venenatum, which is fermented in vats that use glucose syrup as
food. 167 Quorn Foods uses mycoprotein as a meat analogue for its frozen
meat-free food products, including the Chik'n patties that allegedly
sickened the plaintiff.168 The FFDCA at 21 U.S.C. § 321(qq) lists major
food allergens that must be labeled as prescribed by the statute at § 343(w),
but mycoprotein is not on that list.169 Nevertheless, the plaintiff alleged
that Quorn's "failure to warn consumers on their product labels of the
'allergenicity' of mycoprotein" made her "unaware of the possible health
risks ... when she purchased the Chik'n Patties."'170 The plaintiff in the
Cardinale case alleged that she experienced vomiting and dizziness within
hours of eating Quorn Chik'n patties, and she was apparently able to isolate
the patties as the cause by eating them multiple times and experiencing the
same symptoms each time.'
The court, in an unpublished opinion, found that the allergen labeling
requirements codified at § 321 of the FFDCA preempted the plaintiffs
claims.' 72 The court reasoned that by enacting uniform allergen labeling
requirements, "Congress expressed a federal intent to occupy the field of
labeling of products with potential food allergens." 73 The court noted that
FDA currently is reviewing mycoprotein's status as a food allergen, but
that "Congress has not yet acted on any recommendation from the FDA to
add [mycoprotein] to the list of allergens it believes consumers should be
warned about in the interests of public health." 7 4 The court further noted
164. See Cardinale v. Quom Foods, Inc., 2011 WL 2418628 (Conn. Super. filed May
19, 2011).
165. See id. at 1.
166. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-1 10b (2010).
167. See How Mycoprotein is made, MYCOPROTEIN (2008),
http://www.mycoprotein.org/what is mycoprotein/productprocess.html.
168. Cardinale, 2011 WL 2418628 at *1.
169. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 343 (2010).
170. Cardinale, 2011 WL 2418628 at *1.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 4-5.
173. Id. at *8.
174. Id.
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that the FDA, "with its staff of food scientists, nutrition experts and vast
regulatory authority over our nation's food supply is in a far better position
and possessed of more adequate resources to properly assess the pros and
cons of additional or specific labeling for the food product at issue here."17 5
Though the Cardinale opinion is an unpublished state court decision,
it is significant for two reasons: (1) it is the first court case (as the authors
are aware) to address the allergenic properties of mycoprotein; and (2) it
represents yet another setback for consumer advocates who have long
argued that the fungus can cause serious allergic reactions and is, therefore,
unsafe. The parent company of Quorn, Marlow Foods, is a British
company that has been selling meat-free mycoprotein products in the UK
since the mid-1980s.1 76 The UK's Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and
Food (the British equivalent of the FDA) approved mycoprotein as safe to
eat in 1985,17 but Marlow nonetheless faced serious opposition from the
Center for Science in the Public Interest (CPSI) when it began selling
Quorn products in the U.S. in 2002. CPSI claimed that hundreds of people
in the UK had had serious adverse allergic reactions to Quorn products
with mycoprotein - including hives, vomiting, fainting, and shortness of
breath - and argued that these products "should not be allowed to remain in
our food supply either as a GRAS substance or a food additive." 78
Nonetheless, FDA stated that it had "no questions" about Marlow Foods'
own determination that mycoprotein is GRAS - which is essentially the
agency's position to date.17 9 CPSI's crusade against the company was
dismissed by food pundits and scientists as "puzzlingly tenacious"' 80 and
"overblown,""' and Marlow's retail sales zoomed to $200 million in
2004.182 But after nearly ten years on the market, the Cardinale complaint
175. Id. at *5.
176. See Kate Jackson, Once-Scorned Quorn Still Alive and Kicking, TODAY'S
DIETICIAN (Aug. 2004), http://www.todaysdietitian.com/newarchives/td_0804
p32.shtml.
177. See id.
178. Letter from Michael F. Jacobson, Ph.D., Executive Director, Center for Science
in the Public Interest, to Dr. Mark McClellan, Commissioner, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (Apr. 21, 2003), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/quorn
mcclellan-letter 4-23.pdf.
179. Letter from Alan M. Rulis, Ph.D., Director, Office of Food Additive Safety,
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Stuart M. Pape, Patton Boggs LLP
(Jan. 7, 2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodingredientsPackaging/
GenerallyRecognizedasSafeGRAS/GRASListings/ucml 54623.htm.
180. Jackson, supra note 176.
181. Joe Lewandowski, Quorn Dogged: Scientists Call Advocacy Group's
Complaints Unfounded, NEWHOPE360.COM (Apr. 24, 2008), http://newhope360.com/
quorn-dogged-scientists-call-advocacy-groups-complaints-unfounded.
182. See Jackson, supra note 176.
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again raises the question of whether FDA should add mycoprotein to its list
of recognized food allergens.
D. Settlement in BPA Litigation
Bisphenol-A (BPA) is a chemical commonly used in polycarbonate
plastics and epoxy resins.183 Whether low concentrations of BPA cause
adverse endocrine-related effects in humans - primarily exposed through
food packaging - remains subject to considerable debate.184 Although food
contact materials fall under FDA jurisdiction, approximately 85 to 90
percent of BPA use in the United States is in products under EPA's Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) authority. 85  Accordingly, the EPA
requested public comment on a toxicity testing and environmental sampling
study of BPA's potential environmental impacts.' 8 6  This study would
complement existing efforts at FDA to study the potential human health
issues associated with BPA consumption via food packaging.' 8 7
Earlier in 2011, Philips Electronics North America Corporation
(Philips), the successor to Avent America, Inc., settled a series of putative
class actions arising from the sale of baby products containing BPA.'" In
January 2011, the parties agreed to a settlement whereby Philips agreed to
not sell baby bottles or "sippy" cups containing BPA.189 However, if a
competitor began selling these products containing BPA, then Philips could
resume sales of the products so long as it disclosed the presence of BPA in
the product material.190 This disclosure mandate would last for one year.19'
The settlement also provided class members a refund for purchased
183. Bisphenol A Action Plan, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, I (Mar.
2010), http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/existingchemicals/pubs/actionplans/bpa-action
plan.pdf.
184. See id. at 1-2 (noting that "BPA is a reproductive, developmental, and systemic
toxicant in animal studies and is weakly estrogenic," which leads to questions about the
impact on children's health).
185. See id. at 3.
186. See EPA. Testing of Bisphenol A, Advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 76
Fed. Reg. 44535 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799).
187. See Update on Bisphenol A for Use in Food Contact Applications: January
2010, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucml97739.htm [hereinafter FDA].
188. In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic Products Liability Litigation,
Master Case NO. 4:08-1967-MD-W-ODS, MDL No. 1967 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
189. See Stipulation of Class Action Settlement, In re Bisphenol-A (BPA)
Polycarbonate Plastic ProductsLiability Litigation, Master Case NO. 4:08-1967-MD-
W-ODS, MDL No. 1967 (W.D. Mo. 2011), available at http://www.wdklaw.com/
images/FE/chain232siteType8/site201/client/Stipulation%200f/20Settlement.pdf.
190. See id. at 16.
191. Id. at 16.
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products sold by Philips that contained BPA.' 92 The injunctive relief,
however, may have little market impact as according to the FDA, major
manufacturers of bottles and infant feeding cups have stopped selling
polycarbonate products containing BPA in the US market - switching back
to more traditional glass and polypropylene bottles and disposable bag
liners. 193
IV. BIOTECHNOLOGY LITIGATION AND REGULATORY UPDATE
A. Alfalfa
In 2004, Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International petitioned
the USDA to deregulate an alfalfa variety resistant to the herbicide
glyphosate.194 A coalition of alfalfa farmers and environmental NGOs
challenged USDA's decision to deregulate the genetically engineered
alfalfa.1 95 The court entered an injunction prohibiting future planting of the
alfalfa variety pending completion by USDA of a full Environmental
Impact Statement.196 The initial problem with the agency's deregulation
decision was the failure to consider the potential impacts of pollen drift on
non-GM farmers as well as the cumulative environmental impact of
another crop resistant to the glyphosate herbicide.' 9 7 The Supreme Court
subsequently reversed this injunction on procedural grounds - leaving
intact the requirement for further agency review of potential environmental
impacts.198
USDA issued a final Environmental Impact Statement for GM Alfalfa
in December 2010.199 In a shift from the agency's previous environmental
assessments, the agency proposed an option of partial deregulation in
addition to the usually proffered preferred alternative of full
deregulation.2 00 The partial deregulation alternative envisioned production
zones to minimize the potential for unwanted cross-pollination and thereby
192. Id. at 17-18.
193. See FDA, supra note 187 (noting Interim Public Health Recommendations).
194. See Petition for Determination of Nonregulated Status for Roundup Ready@
Alfalfa (Medicago Sativa L.) Events JI01 and J163, 19 (2004), APHIS (Apr. 16, 2004),
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/04_11001p.pdf.
195. See Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624 at *12 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
13, 2007).
196. See id. at 12.
197. See id.
198. See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2743 (2010).
199. See USDA, GLYPHOSATE-TOLERANT ALFALFA EVENTS J1101 AND J163: REQUEST
FOR NONREGULATED STATUS; FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (Dec.
2010).
200. See id. at iv.
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facilitate coexistence between GM and non-GM alfalfa. Although the
agency eventually settled on the full deregulation alternative,201 the
consideration of a partial deregulation decision to facilitate coexistence was
a significant signal by the agency that it may seriously consider coexistence
impacts in future regulatory decisions.
B. GM Rice Lawsuit
In 1998, Aventis CropScience (Aventis) began field testing a
genetically engineered rice variety resistant to the Liberty Link brand
herbicide. At the time, Aventis (later purchased by Bayer CropScience),
202did not seek regulatory approval for the rice variety. In January 2006,
Riceland Foods, Inc. (Riceland), the largest rice cooperative in the United
States, discovered trace amounts of genetically engineered DNA in the
2005 rice harvest.2 03 USDA publically confirmed the stray genetic material
as LLRice601 (Liberty Link Rice) in August 2006.204 Importers in Japan
and the European Union subsequently banned long-grain rice imports from
the US and implemented genetic testing regimes.2 05 The first lawsuits were
filed against Bayer and Riceland within days of the USDA
announcement.206
1. Duty to Defend
Riceland, a successful plaintiff (jury verdict of more than $136
million) in an Arkansas state case against Bayer CropScience (Bayer) in the
207
Liberty Link Rice contamination litigation, is also a defendant in over
170 lawsuits brought by rice farmers over the contamination of their
conventional crops with the genetically engineered Liberty Link variety.208
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the issuer of a commercial general liability
201. See Record of Decision, Glyphosate-Tolerant Alfalfa Events 1101 and J163:
Request for Nonregulated Status, APHIS (Jan 27, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov
/#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2007-0044-12941.
202. See AgrEvo USA Co., Availability of Determination of Nonregulated Status for
Rice Genetically Engineered for Glufosinate Herbicide Tolerance, 64 Fed. Reg. 22595,
22595 (April 27, 1999) (USDA approval of petition for nonregulated status for two
related GE rice events - LLRice06 and LLRice 62 - but not LLRice 601).
203. See Bayer Crop Science v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518 at 3.
204. See id.
205. See id at 4.
206. See id.
207. See Martinne Geller, Bayer ordered to pay $136.8 mln in U.S. rice case,
RUETERS (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/21/idUSN212980
2520110321.
208. See Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WL 2262932 (E.D. Ark.
2011).
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policy for Riceland, refused coverage, arguing that the policy expressly
precluded liability from cross-pollination. 2 09 The court, however, found for
Riceland, holding that because the policy was silent regarding liability for
the physical mixing of the GE crop with conventional rice during harvest,
processing, transportation, or storage - allegations made by plaintiff
farmers in addition to cross-pollination - Liberty Mutual had a duty to
defend the entire action brought against Riceland.2 10
2. Settlement
During the Riceland-Liberty Mutual insurance coverage litigation, a
number of plaintiffs brought successful claims against Bayer. In the first
federal case, a jury awarded two Missouri farmers approximately $2
million in compensatory damages for the economic loss arising from the
contamination of the rice supply. 21' Three farmers from Arkansas and
Mississippi obtained a $1.5 million federal verdict a month later.2 12 In
April 2010, 14 farmer-plaintiffs obtained a state verdict of approximately
$6 million in compensatory damages and $42 million in punitive
213damages. An informal survey of jury verdicts and settlements with
farmers indicated an average compensatory damage award of over
$434,000, 214 not including the Riceland victory noted above.
In July 2011, Bayer agreed to a $750 million settlement in an attempt
to end any future threat of litigation. 2 15 The settlement allows rice farmers
to opt into one of three settlement pools. Pool one compensates for
"market losses" and is available to any farmer who planted rice between
209. See Id. at 3-4.
210. Seeld.at3-5.
211. See Joe Whittington & Andrew M. Harris, Bayer Must Pay Farmers for
Contaminated Rice Crop (Update 5), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=adGubJZ21 Uzo.
212. See Allison Retka, Second contaminated rice trial nets another plaintiff's
verdict, MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY (Mar. 1, 2010) available at
http://www.grgpc.com/News-PDFs/GRG48.pdf
213. Margaret Cronin Fisk & Joe Whittington, Bayer Loses Fifh Straight Trial over
U.S. Rice Crops, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 14, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2010/07/14/AR2010071404574.
214. See id.; Margaret Cronin Fisk & Joe Whittington, Bayer Settles Texas Suits
Alleging its GM Seed Contaminated Rice Fields, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-18/bayer-settles-suits-with-texas-farmers-
over-genetically-engineered-rice.html (3 famers settle for $270,000); Rice Famers
Settle with Bayer BIZJOURNALS (Jan 14, 2011), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/
news/2011/01/14/rice-farmers-settle-with-bayer.html (4 farmers settle for $873,000).
215. See David Bennett, GM rice: settlement construction and farmer options, DELTA
FARM PRESS (July 3, 2011), http://deltafarmpress.com/print/rice/gm-rice-settlement-
construction-and-farmer-options.
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2006 and 20 10.216 The pool establishes a damages schedule that.
compensates farmers on a per acre basis for economic damages incurred as
21a result of decreased export demand for US-grown rice.21 Farmers who
suffered damages beyond the market losses covered by the first pool can
recover by opting into one of two other settlement pools with more
complex filing requirements.
The second settlement pool compensates farmers who planted two
contaminated seed varieties later banned by the government - Cheniere and
Clearfield 131.218 In an effort to prevent further contamination of the rice
seed supply, farmers were instructed not to plant any variety of rice on land
planted with the Cheniere or Clearfield 131 variety the previous year. In
response, those farmers either planted less lucrative soybeans or let the land
219
lay fallow. The settlement will compensate those farmers $100 per acre.
Farmers experiencing other losses, such as cleaning expenses or any other
documented losses may claim actual losses under the third settlement pool,
up to a cumulative cap of $100 million.220
The voluntary settlement as a whole is premised upon one big
condition: farmers who farmed at least 85% of the total acres of rice
planted in the United States between 2006 and 2009 must participate in the
settlement, and if that 85% threshold is not achieved, then Bayer reserves
the right to opt out.221 Of course, this would result in additional,
individualized litigation in state and federal courts - litigation in which
Bayer has yet to prevail in any of the previous trials.
The Bayer LibertyLink settlement is reminiscent of the 2002
settlement between Aventis Crop Science and thousands of corn farmers
affected by contamination of StarLink GM corn with corn intended for
food and export channels. 222 In 1998 and 1999, Aventis received EPA
approval, subject to several restrictions, to market the StarLink variety of
seed corn. 22 3 In 2000, numerous reports surfaced that human food products
216. See id.
217. Farmers can prove their damages simply by producing FSA Form 578 (which
lists the number of rice acres planted by that farmer in a given year). See id. Damages
start at $120 per acre for rice planted in 2006, declining to $10 per acre for rice planted
in 2010. Id.




222. See D.L. Uchtmann & Gary Hoff, Non-StarLink Farmer Litigation: Where is
MY Settlement Payment? How Much Is It? What Do I Do When It Arrives? How Is It
Taxed?, AGRIC. L. & TAx'N BRIEFS 04-12 (Nov. 4, 2004).
223. See D.L. Uchtmann, StarlinkTM - A Case Study of Agricultural Biotechnology
Regulation, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159, 162 (2002).
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had tested positive for the GM protein found in the StarLink corn
variety.224 Manufacturers issued recalls for products containing corn and
fear of contamination convinced some food processors to replace
domestically produced corn with imports.22 5 The market price for corn fell
and many members of the supply chain required testing of all corn
shipments for the presence of StarLink DNA. 22 6 I subsequent class-action
litigation, a federal district court in Illinois ruled that Aventis had a duty to
ensure that its GM variety did not enter the food supply (i.e., a duty to
abide by the EPA's permit restrictions) and that Aventis breached several
of these obligations, which caused the plaintiffs' corn to be
contaminated. 2 27 The court then approved a $110 million class-action
settlement designed to compensate farmers for their losses.228
The settlement in the GM Liberty Link rice litigation is almost seven
times the amount in the StarLink corn class action. Considered together,
these two GM contamination cases have established additional certainty in
the evolving common law of biotechnology - crop developers will be held
responsible for the market losses resulting from the unauthorized
commingling of their regulated GM products with conventional crops.
Moreover, the economic loss rule may not insulate firms in contractual
privity with impacted farmers. Accordingly, firms should take particular
precautions to develop and implement coexistence strategies that prevent
unwanted commingling.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Governments walk a fine line between public protection and
nannying, and the optimal level of regulation is often frustratingly difficult
to obtain. The developments described in this Update suggest that the
federal government is still tinkering with its health and food safety
regulations but has, in some cases, decided that it needs to be more
proactive about protecting the public from unhealthy and dangerous food.
While the tort system has in many cases moved to fill in perceived gaps in
this system of federal oversight (e.g., diacetyl and mycoprotein labeling), it
has at the same time pushed back when federal agencies take proactive
224. See id. at 182.
225. Thomas P. Redick & Donald L. Uchtmann, Coexistence Through Contracts:
Export-Oriented Stewardship in Agricultural Biotechnology vs. California's
Precautionary Containment, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 207, 213-14 (2008).
226. In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833-35.
227. Id. at 843.
228. Redick & Uchtmann, supra note 225, at 214 (citing In re StarLink Corn
Products Liability Litigation, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2001)) (this class
action suit was settled for $110,000,000).
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(some would say reactive) steps to protect the public (e.g., the Seaside
Farms lawsuit). This inter-branch tug-of-war has played out in the midst of
secondary, but very relevant, political concerns such as a sagging economy
that threatens federal funding for food safety programs, as well as a
burgeoning local foods movement that demands less regulation of food
production. In the near term, then, we can probably expect much of the
same: a federal government that addresses food safety issues in fits and
starts, and a tort system that opportunistically provides a backstop when
regulatory efforts amount to a swing and a miss.

